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Abstract 
Homogenization destroys biologic structures and social organizations or companies. 
Sometimes structure und sometimes mixing yields the highest productivity. Why and 
when will destruction be creative? We theoretically demonstrate in a simple enzyme 
ensemble of source and sink superadditivity and subadditivity by mixing or structured 
transfer (compartmentalization). Saturating production functions in combination with 
linear cost functions create besides superadditivity and subadditivity strong rationality 
and irrationality. Whenever a saturated source gives a costing substrate to an 
unsaturated sink where the substrate will be earning superadditivity of the ensemble of 
both will be observed. Such conditions characterize symbiosis and synergism. In 
antagonistic interactions (antibiosis) an earning substrate is taken from a source to be a 
costing substrate in a sink. Subadditivity will appear within the ensemble when the 
substrate will be more costing or less earning after the transfer. Only in superadditivity 
an active ensemble (with substrate transfer) will have superior productivity in 
comparison to an inactive ensemble (no transfer of substrate). Mixing is able to destroy 
irrational transfers reversing the role of source and sink. In life forms the transfer may 
be accompanied by brute force, a mirror of higher affinity in enzymes. The different 
outcomes are interrelated regions on a surface within a three dimensional transfer 
space or ensemble space. 
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Introduction 
Substrates are not equally distributed in beakers without mixing and organisms or 
societies. A central dogma of biochemistry is mixing of enzymatic reaction volumes to 
improve the productivity of biochemical reactions. Homogenisation of an organism will 
destroy the main features of live. A central idea of biology is compartmentalization on all 
levels of complexity from cells to societies. Does this contrast root in a different 
foundation? Enzymes produce products from substrates (educts) in tubes and cells 
according to saturating production functions. Enzymes may be part of a linear or 
branched reaction chain. In branch points two identical or different enzymes compete 
for the same substrate. The substrate comes always at a cost either to the biochemist 
or to the organism. Cost functions are considered to be of linear nature to the amount. 
The enzyme will produce a product that confers some benefit (b) to the organism. When 
a source transfers substrate to a sink superadditivity and subadditivity will be observed. 
The reason is that in e.g. Michaelis-Menten type of production functions the cost (c) of 
the substrate will be at low saturation below the productivity but at high saturation the 
productivity will be below the cost. Therefore, benefit cost ratios larger than one (b/c>1) 
or benefit cost ratios smaller than one (b/c<1) will be observed. In the eye of the 
economist the net profit (b-c) will be positive or negative. In 1999 Turner and Chao (1) 
published a paper on Prisoner´s dilemma in an RNA virus. The focus of this paper was 
prisoner´s dilemma and game theory. We are able to explain the observed 
superadditivity in this paper (1, page 442, Figure 1b). In addition, we suggest an 
alternative view on conflict and harmony on different levels of complexity.  
 
Theory 
We set up a system of a “source” (so), a productive entity where substrates come from, 
a “sink” (si), a productive entity where substrates go to and an “ensemble” (e), a 
productive entity consisting of source and sink. The source will “give” or “give not”, the 
sink will “take” or “take not” the substrate depending on the degree of the actual benefit 
(b) to cost (c) ratio. To change the cost a party may give or take. To keep the cost a 
party may give not or take not. The option to a source is to give or give not. The option 
to a sink is to take or take not. At b/c>1 a source will not give the valuable substrate. At 
a ratio of b/c<1 the source will give to reduce costing substrate. The sink will take at 
b/c>1 but will not take at a ratio of b/c<1. Both parties neither take nor give at b/c=1. 
This is summarized in table 1.  
 
Table 1  
 
source sink behaviour of the single party  result 
b/c ≥ 1 b/c >1 The source will not give. 
The sink will take. 
conflict 
b/c < 1 b/c >1 The source will give. 
The sink will take. 
harmony 
b/c < 1 b/c ≤ 1 The source will give. 
The sink will not take. 
conflict 
b/c ≥ 1 
  
b/c ≤ 1 The source will not give. 
The sink will not take. 
no conflict 
or  
irrationality 
  
Simple selfish behaviour of both parties leads to “conflict”, “no conflict” and “harmony” 
within the ensemble. In harmony a transfer of substrate will always be superadditive (a 
win-win situation, strong rationality). In case of conflict (win-lose; lose-win) the result of 
a transfer may be superadditive (win exceeds loss) or subadditive (loss exceeds win). In 
case of “no conflict” strong irrationality appears when an exchange is realized against all 
reasonable behaviour. Irrationality is an extreme form of subadditivity (a lose-lose 
situation). A b/c ratio of 1 is considered an optimal b/c ratio in our system (b-c=0). This 
contrasts with the general expectation that b/c ratios greater than 1 are desirable as 
they produce profit (b-c>0, net profit ($) = sales revenue ($) - total costs ($)). The 
amount of substrate is a Janus-like thing. On one side the substrate has a cost attribute. 
Cost should be avoided or reduced. On the other side it has a benefit attribute as a 
benefit will be produced from the substrate. Benefits should be sought and increased. At 
b/c=1 a stable equilibrium between both types of aims is reached. In our model profit 
seems better comparable to superadditivity. For example in a hunting ensemble glucose 
(cost) will be used during the hunt preferentially in muscles and brain to catch the prey 
(benefit) and not in intestines. A rational transfer from glucose from the intestines to 
brain and muscles takes place. During digestion glucose (cost) will be redirected via 
blood flow to the intestines to energize nutrient (benefit) uptake. The profit of this 
ensemble on glucose basis will be positive. The profit would be negative if glucose 
would be preferentially used in intestines during the hunt and in muscles and brain 
during digestion (an irrational transfer). Benefit and profit should not be mixed. Benefit 
(an advantageous gain or return) is a complex concept. Benefit and cost have 
quantitative and qualitative aspects. In the transfer space and in the ensemble space 
we compare benefits relative to costs in different distribution of the same substrate 
between two enzymes (productive entities). Enzymes are well understood productive 
entities in cells. The enzyme is a fix cost to the cell. This fix cost is for simplicity not 
included in our model. In organisms the productivity of enzymes is of genetically fixed 
size. Therefore, to achieve the optimal benefit/cost ratio b/c=1 only the change of cost 
on a short time scale is an option - a mutation is considered to be on a longer time scale 
as an improved or reduced productivity will be realized in a future enzyme version. This 
may be different in other productive entities where a change of productivity is a fast and 
easy option. We treat the cost attribute of the substrate in transfer and homogenisation 
differently. Structure and information correlate. Structured transfer preserves the 
connection of the substrate and its cost attribute. Homogenisation destroys this 
connection as structure and information are lost. The cost always precedes the benefit. 
The cost is a benefit of a preceding step. The benefit will be a cost to a following step. A 
setting like this is known in biochemistry as a reaction chain and in biology as the food 
chain. In biology the input by the source exceeds the output by the sink by far. This 
results in the interpretation of a pyramid. The system of source and sink is an open 
system. The observed source was a sink to an earlier source and the observed sink will 
be the source to a later sink. Sources and sinks may be an ensemble, too. The whole 
setting is primarily powered by the sun or chemical energy sources (dark, extreme 
environments). Source, sink and the ensemble of both share the transfer space and the 
ensemble space (2, and figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
Figure 1  
 
a. The transfer space. Source and the sink appear as two dimensional projections to the 
outside of the ensemble. The dark blue and dark green straight lines are the linear cost 
function of source and sink. The light green and light blue saturating curves are the 
Michaelis-Menten type production function of the benefit in source and sink. The red 
lines on the side separate b/c<1 from b/c>1 (benefit source bso, cost source cso, benefit 
sink bsi, cost sink csi). The red line on the ground separates the outcome for the system 
(∆bsi/∣∆bso∣>1, production; ∆bsi/∣∆bso∣<1 consumption). ∆b is benefit before transfer 
minus benefit after transfer. ∆bso is benefit lost in source and ∆bsi is benefit gained in 
sink. The coordinates of the space are substrate concentration in source and sink and 
be-ce= z. The linear amount given or taken corresponds to a non-linear benefit lost or 
gained. 
b. The ensemble space. The coordinates are bso/cso; bsi/csi and be/ce (benefit of the 
ensemble be, cost for the ensemble ce). The origin of this space is 1. The ensemble 
space appears within the transfer space in an upside (large quotients b/c) down 
manner. 
Calculations 
The concentration of the substrate is ideally kept constant in steady state equilibrium. 
No product inhibition is observed. The reaction velocity v is interpreted as productivity - 
the production of some benefit. v= [S]/(Km+[S])*Vmax according to (3). The cost is a 
linear function to the amount of substrate. The cost accrues before the benefit. Transfer 
of substrate transfers cost. Mixing equalizes the substrate concentration after the cost 
has been paid for. Our investigation takes into account three different cases of enzyme 
ensembles, all producing according to a Michaelis-Menten productivity function: 
1. The symmetric ensemble: We assume both enzymes have Vmax of 5 µmol/min and 
Km of 0.25 mmol/l substrate concentration and substrate ownership involves a linear 
cost factor of  3.5 per mmol/l substrate concentration. 
2. The first asymmetric ensemble: Here we assume Vmax to be 5 µmol/min for source 
and 15 µmol/min for sink. Km in source set to be 0.25 mmol/l and in sink Km is 0.1 
mmol/l. Substrate ownership costs 3.5 per mmol/l substrate for source and is doubled in 
sink. 
3. The second asymmetric ensemble: Here source and sink change roles compared to 
the first asymmetric ensemble. For each of these three cases we examine three kinds of 
behaviour: 
a.) Inactive (red): Both enzymes produce separately. 
b.) Transfer (green): Source transfers a very small amount of substrate to sink.  
vso= [Sso-∆S]/(Km+[Sso-∆S])*Vmax; vsi=[Ssi+∆S]/(Km+[Ssi+∆S])*Vmax   
c.) Homogenisation (blue): The total substrate is shared equally between both enzymes, 
but costs remain with the original contributor. 
For all nine combinations we have two 3D-diagrams each: 
A: Substrate concentration of source and sink as independent variables produce a total 
net productivity (productivity minus cost) which is displayed on the vertical axis 
B: productivity/cost quotients for source and sink produce a total productivity/cost 
quotient for the ensemble. 
The diagram of type B is produced by calculating the substrate concentration S from a 
given quotient x of productivity/cost in an intermediate step: S= Vmax/(cx)-Km. All 
diagrams were created by MuPAD Pro 4.0.6 computer algebra system. 
 
Results  
We calculate the combined cost normalized productivity (b-c; b/c) of source and sink 
with transfer of substrate (active ensemble) or without transfer of substrate (inactive 
ensemble). Besides transfer we investigated simple mixing or no mixing (inactive 
ensemble). We obtain surfaces in the transfer space and the ensemble space. In 
symmetric ensembles both enzymes have identical Km, Vmax and cost values. In two 
types of asymmetric ensembles Vmax, Km and cost values in source and sink are 
different. Neither transfer cost nor mixing cost or fix cost is considered. The size of Km 
and Vmax compare to known lactic dehydrogenases, a cofactor is not considered. 
 
In figure 2 we compare inactive ensembles (red surfaces, compartments are isolated) to 
active ensembles (connected compartments with transfer, green surfaces or mixing, 
blue surfaces).  
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In the transfer space we compare transfer (a, c, e; green surfaces) and mixing (b, d, f; 
blue surfaces) in symmetric (a, b) and asymmetric (c, d, e, f) ensembles with an 
ensemble of two neither mixing nor transferring compartments (all red surfaces). The 
values for the symmetric ensemble a, b: Vmax source and sink 5 µmol/min, Km source 
and sink 0.25 mmol/l, cost source and sink 3.5 times amount substrate. The values for 
the asymmetric ensembles c, d: Vmax source 5 µmol/min, Km source 0.25 mmol/l, cost 
source 3.5 times amount substrate, Vmax sink 15 µmol/min, Km sink 0.1 mmol/l, cost sink 
7 times amount substrate and asymmetric ensemble e, f: Vmax source 15 µmol/min, Km 
source 0.1 mmol/l, cost source 7 times of the substrate amount  Vmax sink 5 µmol/min, 
Km sink 0.25 mmol/l, cost sink 3.5 times amount substrate. In case of a transfer the 
source will give 0.15 mmol substrate to the sink. Concentrations below 0.15 mmol/l are 
therefore not considered. The cost is calculated according to the substrate 
concentration after transfer. In case of mixing the cost is paid before mixing. 
 
It is clearly visible that movement of substrate by transfer or mixing from a compartment 
of low productivity because of high saturation and high cost to a compartment of better 
productivity because of low saturation and low cost results in superadditivity (figure 2a, 
2b, green or blue surface above red surface). Transfer in a symmetric ensemble (2a) 
results in superadditivity, however there are also regions of mild or severe subadditivity 
(irrationality). In these regions (b-c<0; b/c<1) the red surface is above the green surface. 
Mixing in a symmetric ensemble (2b) is always causing superadditivity (blue surface 
always above red surface). The exception is at identical substrate concentration in both 
compartments with simple additivity (red broken line). Subadditivity is not observed.  
In the two types of asymmetric ensembles we observe basically the same. In addition, 
we now learn that mixing may also create subadditivity (red area above blue area). 
Subadditivity will appear when smaller concentration differences are aligned in a way 
that expensive substrate in a high productive compartment is mixed with a low 
productive compartment. The reason is that the cost is paid in the order of events 
before the mixing event by each side separately. A large red area emerges (figure 2d, 
2f) in the middle. Here simple additivity of the inactive ensemble dominates. At large 
concentration differences the effect of the different cost and productivity is lost and 
superadditivity (blue) of the active ensemble is observed again. In transfer (2c, 2e) the 
superadditive area shifts towards the side with smaller productivity. 
It is obvious that mixing or transfer may free productivity potentials. The active 
ensemble (transfer or mixing) is in some areas superior to the inactive ensemble. To 
judge what is better - transfer or mixing - we compared the active surfaces of transfer 
(green) and mixing (blue) in figure 3. In a symmetric ensemble there is only a line (blue-
green) where transfer (green) is equal to mixing (blue). Along this line the concentration 
difference between source and sink equals two times (0.30mmol/l) the amount 
transferred (figure 3a). In the direct neighbourhood of this line mixing is marginally 
better than transferring 0.15mmol/l. If we take into account different cost and 
productivity in source and sink in asymmetric ensembles an area appears here with true 
superadditivity of transfer (green) over mixing (blue). 
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The calculation of an active ensemble with transfer (green) or mixing (blue) is identical 
to figure 2 and results in the same surface. Symmetric ensemble a: Vmax source and 
sink 5 µmol/min, Km source and sink 0.25 mmol/l, cost source and sink 3.5 times 
amount substrate; asymmetric ensemble b: Vmax source 5 µmol/min, Km source 0.25 
mmol/l, cost source 3.5 times amount substrate, Vmax sink 15 µmol/min, Km sink 0.1 
mmol/l, cost sink 7 times amount substrate and asymmetric ensemble c: Vmax source 15 
µmol/min, Km source 0.1 mmol/l, cost source 7 times of the substrate amount  Vmax sink 
5 µmol/min, Km sink 0.25 mmol/l, cost sink 3.5 times amount substrate. In case of 
transfer source will give 0.15 mmol substrate to sink. The cost is calculated according to 
the substrate concentration after transfer. In case of mixing the cost is paid before 
mixing. 
 
 
At high cost and high productivity in the sink a small region of superadditivity created by 
transfer is superior to mixing.  Here source and sink are not saturated (figure 3b) and 
the ensemble rearranges productivity. Low saturation is a condition often observed in 
nature. At high cost as well as high productivity in the source and saturated productivity 
in source and sink a large area of superadditivity by transfer is observed. Here the 
saturated ensemble rearranges cost (figure 3c). Transfer will be suspended by mixing if 
the following limits are exceeded:  a. the concentration difference is more than two 
times the size of the amount transferred (symmetric ensemble); b. in case the transfer 
would be irrational; c. transfer costs are larger than superadditivity through substrate 
transfer (the costs of mixing are generally considered negligible small); d. if the velocity 
of the formation of the concentration difference is similar to the velocity of the transfer. 
The limit d points to an additional strength of transfers - repeatability. The effect of 
superadditivity of a transfer is reinforced by repetition and its internal time scale. Mixing 
will force a system to adjust to the external time scale of the build-up of concentration 
differences. Therefore, even in areas where a single mixing event will generate more 
productivity than a single transfer, repeated transfer may be superior to single mixing. In 
symmetric ensembles a single transfer will never be better than mixing. 
The benefit to cost ratios of source, sink and the ensemble of source and sink in figure 4 
teach the same. In addition, we better see that the superadditivity created in asymmetric 
ensembles by mixing and transfer is much stronger than in symmetric ensembles. The 
ensemble space is highly non-linear. A small linear change of substrate in the transfer 
space will have a big effect on the benefit to cost ratio in the ensemble space, especially 
at low saturation.  The three different surfaces (red, inactive; blue, mixing; green, 
transfer) in figure 4 appear in different areas on top of the other areas. A patchwork of 
different optimal behaviours is in some points in direct neighbourhood.  
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The ensemble space: The orientation of this presentation is in contrast to figure 1eeb 
upside (large quotients b/c) up. The benefit to cost ratios of source and sink are 
displayed on x and y axis. Although mixing (blue) transfer (green, here 0,015mmol) and 
inactive ensemble (red) form a complete surface we only show the highest values for 
the ensemble in a source and sink pair. The surfaces are partially transparent to make 
the three axes visible. In the symmetric ensemble (4a) we only see two lines where 
inactivity (red) or transfer (green) is as good as simple mixing. In the asymmetric case 
with a low productivity, low cost source (4b) transfer is only the best at high b/c ratios 
i.e. at low saturation in source and sink. In the second asymmetric case with a low 
productivity, low cost sink (4c) transfer is better at low and medial b/c values. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion 
Two compartments containing productive entities may stay separated or transfer 
substrates preserving the concentration difference or mix and equalize the substrate 
concentration. Destructive homogenisation or mixing seems to be antagonistic to 
structured organisation of substrate transfer.  However, mixing and structure may both 
lead to optimized productivity under certain constraints. Mixing will improve the 
productivity of a symmetric ensemble (identical enzymes) abolishing asymmetric 
distribution of substrates. A small window exists where mixing and transfer are equal. 
Mixing will destroy all forms of irrational transfers or transfers that are too small and 
increase in that way productivity in asymmetric ensembles. This brings back the idea of 
Schumperter´s gale in economics. Transfer within an asymmetric ensemble may lead to 
strong superadditivity under asymmetric distribution of the substrate. Mixing and equal 
concentration would here destroy the ability to generate superadditivity in small 
concentration differences. The evolution of the first cells must have been predated by 
less structured precursors. It is difficult to imagine that in the course of evolution from 
biochemistry to biology the driving force would suddenly change. We interpret evolution 
as a process where increasing superadditivity (or decreasing subadditivity) is generated 
by productivity compartmentalized in space and time. A self-copying process seems to 
be comparable to perfect mixing as the product is its own substrate. To copy a different 
molecule which in return will copy the first molecule would be a compartmentalization at 
least in time. This may have started in the window of symmetric ensembles where the 
effect of mixing and transfer is comparable, enhanced by repeated copying. The 
hypercycle would be an ensemble compartmentalized in time (4, 5) and cells in space 
and time. We suggest that molecular organization, division of labour and specialisation 
will start with superadditivity of an ensemble of source and sink. In the progressing 
specialisation neither the sink nor the source will be lost. In a fully integrated ensemble 
the source will finally serve as a collector and supplier for the better productive sink or 
the sink will become a valve and a disposer for the better productive source. A branch 
point becomes a reaction chain. A different type of ensemble integration will be 
observed in stable branch points when transfer costs consume the product of  
superadditivity and neither source nor sink gain while the ensemble gains. In a third 
type of fully integrated ensembles the productivity of the single party will be zero (e.g. 
the male-female ensemble). Finally, we want to emphasize that our considerations have 
nothing in common with cooperative game theory. The superadditivity of the ensemble 
has a biochemical reason. Linear cost functions in combination with saturating 
production functions are responsible for both - superadditivity and subadditivity. The 
whole may be more (Aristotle) but also less than the sum of the single components. The 
superadditivity of the grand coalition however is a theoretical construct. Superadditivity 
in our model is not violating the conservation laws because it is only better efficiency. 
 
Conclusions 
We suggest that mixing and compartmentalization are two sides of the same coin. 
Mixing is reasonable in symmetric ensembles to avoid concentration differences. 
Compartmentalization is reasonable in asymmetric ensembles utilizing small 
concentration differences to produce superadditivity and achieve that mixing and 
concentration differences coexist. As all members of a species compete basically for 
identical substrates (energy, building blocks, money) we think that the transfer space 
and the ensemble space are also tools to look in a new way on interactions between 
organisms and to understand the continuum of harmony, conflict, rationality and  
irrationality and the resulting success (production and superadditivity 
∆bsi*∣∆cso∣/∣∆bso∣*∆csi>1 or consumption and subadditivity ∆bsi*∣∆cso∣/∣∆bso∣*∆csi<1; ∆bso 
is benefit lost in source and ∆bsi is benefit gained in sink. ∆cso is cost lost in source and 
∆csi is cost increased in sink) of an ensemble, the invisible but always present third 
party. Observing a successful ensemble makes us forget that there may be a hidden 
source giving an earning substrate or a sink taking a costing substrate on the one hand, 
and on the other hand observing a growing source or sink may obscure observations of 
a doomed ensemble. In contrast, suffering sources or sinks within a successful 
ensemble may be stable as long as they are able to regenerate in the open system at a 
sufficient rate. 
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